On the Three Analytic Philosophies

Abstract

In this article, I distinguish between three different meanings of the expression “analytic philosophy” and three corresponding concepts currently in use. The first is the doctrinal concept of analytic philosophy, associated with a particular set of substantive claims characteristic of English-speaking philosophers in the first half of the 20th century: according to it analytic philosophy presupposes a focus on analysis, trust in logical formalism, antimetaphysical attitudes, and so on. This concept has historical value but is not suitable for characterizing contemporary analytic philosophy, which has long lacked such (or indeed any) doctrinal specificity. Acknowledging the absence of any necessary doctrinal unity in contemporary analytic philosophy, some philosophers employ another concept to refer to it — one that can be called genealogical: they point to a number of founding figures of analytic philosophy in the first sense and define contemporary analytic philosophers as those who are connected to these founders through an unbroken chain of academic and personal succession (i.e., teacher-student relationships, and the like). This genealogical concept yields a useful extensional definition, one that largely aligns with those whom we intuitively tend to recognize as analytic philosophers today. However, its drawback lies in its deflationary nature, depriving the term “analytic philosophy” of any internal content. The third concept is a normative one: analytic philosophy as a philosophical practice guided by a particular set of normative ideals — that is, views about what good philosophy should be. These normative ideals include clarity, precision, argumentative rigor, reason-responsiveness, and the like. (By contrast, the normative ideals of continental philosophy may include such things as novelty of ways to think, ability to make an impression, originality, the ability to effect transformative changes in the reader or society, and so on.) I argue that discussions about what analytic philosophy is often conflate these three concepts — a conflation that can and should be avoided — and that the normative concept is the most valuable and illuminating one for characterizing contemporary analytic philosophy (as opposed to the historic analytic philosophy, that is best characterized by the doctrinal notion).